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Abstract
We examine Danish student participation in upper secondary and university
education in 1985 and 2005 using a generalization of the famous Mare educa-
tional transition model. Factors not related to the observed characteristics of
the household in which the respondent was raised have become more important
relative to observable family background variables for upper secondary school
success than they were a generation ago. This conclusion is based a new mo-
bility index which we have developed to measure the relative dependence of
respondent educational success on family background variables which in turn
resolves a paradox in our empirical results. The conclusion is also conrmed by
the application of the conventional methods that are usually used to measure
mobility.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether there have been any changes
in intergenerational educational mobility for recent cohorts of Danes, adding
important methodological features to the study of Breen et al. 2009 and others,
and a recent special issue in Research in Social Stratication and Mobility. Our
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contribution to the stratication literature is to explain the pattern of increas-
ing intergenerational educational mobility or declining inequality in eductional
opportunity by estimating Lillard-Willis (1994) bivariate probability models or
correlated Mare models on each cohort for both males and females and com-
paring the degree of dependency of educational attainment outcomes on the
respondents observable family background characteristics across these two co-
horts. The approach used here is similar in spirit to Cameron and Heckman
(1998) and many other researchers before them who also focused on this issue
of dependency or ascription. It can be seen as a generalization of the seminal
Mare (1980, 1981) model where the random components in the latent variables
which determine each stage outcome are no longer independent. In addition,
we also describe educational mobility in terms of conditional probabilities and
odds ratios. We are also o¤erring a new mobility index.
There are a large number of studies both within sociology and economics
that attempt to relate individual performance as measured by educational at-
tainment, earnings, or occupation to the characteristics of the household in
which the individual grew up. These are seen as crucial in determining chil-
drens outcomes as adults, both in the educational system and in the labour
market. This literature is reviewed in Mare (1981), Haveman and Wolfe (1995),
Dustmann (2004), Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005), Shavit, Yaish and Bar-
Hakim (2007), McIntosh and Munk (2007)1 , Breen et al. (2009), Marks (2009),
Björklund, Lindahl, and Lindquist (2010), and Black and Devereux (2011).
In addition, there is a literature on changes in economic, educational, and
social mobility over time and across cohorts including a literature on intergener-
ational changes in choice of secondary education (see Heath and Cli¤ord (1990)
going back to the tradition of Glass (1954)). Recent trends in European strati-
cation and educational mobility are examined by Shavit et al. (2007), Breen and
1The e¤ects of family background variables on educational attainment are examined in
this paper. They appear to be smaller for Denmark than Belzil and Hansen (2003) found for
US white males in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. They attribute 67% of the
explained cross-sectional variation in educational attainments to family background variables.
Whereas, McIntosh and Munk (2007) found that this was about 50% for Danish respondents.
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Jonsson (2007), and Breen et al. (2009). Both studies report some change in ed-
ucational mobility for some of countries considered. Breen and Jonsson (2007)
point out that changes over time in social uidity are more likely to be cohort-
driven than period-driven. Overall Breen et al. 2009 nd an overall decline in
most of the European On the other hand Wiborg and Hansen (2009) do not
nd a decline in the importance of familiy background for selected European
countries.
For Canada Wanner (1999) found that relative mobility rates are unchanged
but these are reversed by the McIntosh (2010) study which employs statistical
techniques to deal with the unobservability problems mentioned above. For the
US, Hauser (2010) concluded that there is no global trend in the intergenera-
tional persistence of education from the 1960s to the 1990s. Similar results
were found by Lucas (2001:1679) who reported that his results were consistent
with maximally maintained inequalityhypothesis, which he reformulated to
the e¤ectively maintained inequalityhypothesis, underlining the possible per-
sistence in educational inequality at a more rened level. Cameron and Heckman
(1998) report the e¤ects of several family background variables on edfucational
attainment. However, these are mixed with the e¤ect of household income show-
ing a slight decline in importance towards the end of their sample period. On
the other hand, their parental education variables retain their importance. Mare
(2011:240-241) summarizes other US studies going back to 1960s and onwards
and responds also to the problem of unmeasured hetereogeneity. Most of the
US results showing stable patterns or even increasing inequality of educational
opportunity except for a few studies reporting some or little change (Shavit,
Yaish and, Bar-Haim 2007: 43; see also Morgan et al. 2006).
For France, Vallet (2004: 31) reports a decline over thirteen cohorts over
the period 1908-1972 using log-linear models to examine changes in associations
between social origin and educational destination. He also notes that the decline
in origin-destination education association in France therefore seems largely
independent of major secondary school reforms introduced to promote equality
of educational opportunity.
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For Italy, Shavit and Westerbeek (1998) found a decrease in educational
inequality at the secondary level but not at the university level. For Sweden,
in many ways close to Denmark, Jonsson (1993), Erikson and Jonsson (1996),
Jonsson and Erikson (2000) tried to show a decline in the social inheritance
e¤ect on educational attainment, including low and intermediate transitions
(see also Erikson and Rudolphi 2010; Breen et al. 2009).
Esping-Andersen (2004) examined educational mobility in several countries
and found that the results depended on the country with increases in Scan-
dinavia and declines in the UK and US. Marks and McMillan (2003) found a
decline in the dependence of educational attainment on social background vari-
ables for Australia for cohorts born during the period 1961-1985. A later study
found declines in both the e¤ects of class background and parental education on
having obtained a bachelor degree (Marks and McMillan 2007; see also Marks
2009).
Bynner and Joshi (2002) examined sample survey data from the 1958 and
1970 cohorts in Britain. They found no change in the response of the probability
of leaving school at age sixteen to family or social origin variables. Blanden and
Gregg (2004) found an increased dependence of tertiary educational attainments
on household income over the period 1958 to 1970 using the British National
Child Development and British Cohort Surveys. Individuals were aged 33 and
30, respectively. We also nd an increase in household income dependence. In
another British study Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005: 352) also found an
increase in the importance of some family background variables but a decline in
the importance of cognitive ability as a determinant of educational attainment.
This is in part due to the fact that low ability children from high economic status
families experienced the largest increases in educational attainment. They also
looked at secondary education, and discovered that the reduction of secondary
school selection on the basis of age 11 ability is likely to have reduced the role
of early cognitive ability in determining a students eventual outcome.
Blanden, Gregg and Machin (2005) examine educational mobility at both the
secondary and tertiary levels and found rst a rise and then a decline in cohort
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educational inequality at the secondary level but an increase at the tertiary
level. They attribute the latter change to increased nancing constraints for
higher education. However, it should be noted that most of these studies use
a rather limited number of family background variables (see also Jackson et al.
2007 for mixed results for Britain).
Most of these studies have focused on nal educational attainment. There
closest study (change formulation) to our work on upper secondary education is
a paper by Dustmann (2004) who uses the German Socioeconomic Panel data
base to examine the secondary school outcomes of a sequence of cohorts the
rst of which was born in 1925 and the last in 1965. He nds using ordered
probability models that the probability of completing German high school for
respondents with working classparents increases moderately over the ten co-
horts and is higher for males than females. This is much lower for respondents
with academicparents whose probabilities also increase with females overtak-
ing males by about 1960. The large gaps between these two probabilities leads
him to conclude that considerable educational immobility still exists in Germany
(see also Breen et al. 2009).
In summary, results di¤er by country and sometimes by type of procedure
employed. Perhaps the most striking feature of the research on the evolution of
intergenerational mobility is the almost uniform neglect of unobservable char-
acteristics. Mare (1993) is an exception, which is also noted by Shavit, Yaish,
and Bar-Hakim (2007: 46-47).
Here, we continue in the tradition of Halsey et al. (1980), Shavit (1984),
Micklewright (1989), Gamoran and Mare (1989), Erikson and Jonsson (1996),
Dustmann (2004), Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2007), Marks (2009), Erikson
and Rudolphi (2010), Rudolphi (2011) by examining participation in upper sec-
ondary education of two cohorts of Danish males and females who were aged 23
in 1985 and 2005, respectively. We also look at participation rates in university
at age 23 in 1985 and 2005 for these cohorts to see whether the trends that ap-
peared at the upper secondary level are likely to continue on into post-secondary
education.
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The paper is organized in the following way. The next section discusses the
declining importance of social origin on choices in the Danish Upper Secondary
Educational System and also a new mobility index. The next section discusses
some methodological problems that arise in educational mobility research. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the relevant literature on changes in educational mobility. Section
4 outlines the data used in the study. Section 5 describes a new estimation pro-
cedure which is based on a generalization of the Mare transition model. The
results appear in section 6 and are discussed in section 7. The analysis of upper
secondary education is done rst. We then briey discuss what has happened
at the tertiary level at the end of this section.
Declining importance of social origin on choices in the Danish Upper
Secondary Educational System Upper secondary education is the place
to begin the analysis of educational mobility since, as Table 1 shows, there
have been phenomenal changes in the way students have completed their upper
secondary schooling. For example, as is shown in this table the proportion of fe-
males who had completed a gymnasium qualication by the age of 23 increased
from 34.1% in 1985 to 54.9% in 2005 a huge increase for such a short period of
time. Upper secondary educational attainments and their dependence on family
background variables is an important issue in its own right. For individuals who
do not continue in the educational system past upper secondary schooling their
life-time earnings are much inuenced by their lack of educational qualications.
But, of course, the most important reason for looking at upper secondary ed-
ucational attainments is because what respondents achieve at this level largely
determines what educational opportunities are available to them at the tertiary
level, especially for gaining entrance to university.
To summarize our results we nd that traditional family background vari-
ables continue to explain a signicant amount of the variation in upper secondary
educational attainments for both males and females. The educational attain-
ment of the respondents parents and household income turned out to be the
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most important variables. However, the occupations of both parents, the num-
ber of siblings that the respondent had and whether the respondents father was
unemployed or had a single mother were also signicant explanatory variables.
Consequently, the dependence of upper secondary educational attainments on
the characteristics of the respondents family remains a prominent feature of
Danish society. But the degree of this dependence has become relatively less
important over the twenty years under consideration.
1.0.1 A NEW MOBILITY INDEX
We construct a new mobility index, which provides a relative measure of the de-
pendence of educational outcomes on traditional observable family background
variables. This index has increased signicantly for both males and females in-
dicating an increase in mobility. Traditional family background variables have
become less important relative to the intercept terms which have increased sig-
nicantly in our statistical models. As is the case for the regression model, these
represent the mean e¤ects of variables which are not included in the model and
increases in them are consistent with an increase in mobility.
Our index also allows us to make comparisons between situations where the
consequences of random e¤ects are di¤erent in the two cohorts. This resolves a
long standing problem in the intergenerational mobility literature when compar-
isons across time periods or educational stages are complicated by unobservable
di¤erences in the variances of the error terms. This is an additional contribution
of the paper.
The index that we employ gives results that agree with and help to explain
established notions of intergenerational educational mobility. The conditional
probabilities of going to gymnasium have improved for all respondents regardless
of their fathers level of education. Likewise the odds for going to gymnasium
have also increased for all respondents but respondents whose fathers have no
education have improved their relative position. At the same time, however, our
results show that the absolute values of the regression coe¢ cients associated with
observable family background variables have actually increased on average over
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the twenty year time period. This would appear to conict with the claim that
mobility has increased. This apparent paradox is resolved by the application of
our new mobility index.
The large increases in the proportion of successful gymnasium completions
by age 23 have been matched by an equally impressive increases in the rate of
participation at University.
Gender plays an important role in the analysis. Girls have done much better
in the [Danish, delete] educational system than boys (Buchman et al. 2008).
They continue to do so at the university level; moreover, but their comparative
advantage over boys has not increased over the twenty years under consideration.
Issues concerning gender are discussed in section 7.
2 Methodological issues
The question that we address in this paper is whether there has been any
change between 1985 and 2005 in the dependence of upper secondary edu-
cational choices on the family backgrounds of Danish students making them.
While the question is quite straightforward providing a comprehensive answer
to it is not. To illustrate what the problems are we will consider a number of
simple examples beginning with the classical regression model and then go on
to models which deal with discrete outcomes.
Suppose that we want to examine the dependence of the continuous variable
yit on another continuous variable xit where the subscripts i and t refer to the
respondent and the time period, respectively. We will assume that there are
two times t1 and t2 with t1 < t2: Most researchers would examine this type of
data in a regression context and estimate the model
yit = 0 + 1xit + it (1)
for both time periods and then determine whether the dependence of y on x
had increased or decreased by looking at the ordinary least squares estimates
of (0; 1) for the two time periods. In equation (1) it is an error term with a
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zero mean and is identically distributed over individuals and independent from
xit.
Dependence will have certainly decreased if the estimate of 1 is lower in
the second period. But it will have also decreased if the intercept term, 0, is
higher in the second period. The reason for this is because the intercept term
captures the e¤ect on y of variables which have been omitted from equation
(1). To see why this is the case suppose that the true data generation process
is given by
yit = 1xit + 2wit (2)
where wit is orthogonal to xit but can not be observed by the researcher2 .
This can be made to look like the standard zero mean error regression model
in equation (1) by letting wt be the sample mean of wit and then adding
and subtracting 2wt to and from the right hand side of equation (2) which
makes 0 = 2wt which is the average e¤ect of the unobservable variables
and it = 2(wit   wt) is the e¤ect of the unobservables which are specic to
individual i.
When the intercept term increases dependence has declined relatively in the
sense that x is less important relative to the omitted variables at t2 than it was
at t1 although 2 has remained constant over the two times.
There is a third case where dependence decreases over the two times and
that is when t, the standard deviation of it increases. When this happens
dependence decreases because the importance of random e¤ects on y have in-
creased over the two time periods. This is also a relative comparison since more
of the variation in y is being explained by random e¤ects relative to the e¤ects
which are due to x. Björklund and Jäntti (2000) have also noted this in their
analysis of intergenerational income mobility.
The situation becomes more complicated when there are many regressors.
This means that  and Xit are now vectors with the rst element of Xit being
a vector of ones making 0 the intercept term as in the case in equation (1).
2Some of the ideas in this section were inspired by the discussion of unobservables in
Cameron and Heckman (1998: 268)
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This leads to
yit = Xit + it (3)
It is possible to compare the individual coe¢ cients but often a summary statistic
which depends on all of the regression parameters is needed. If an index, whose
purpose is for making intertemporal comparisons, is going to be constructed the
coe¢ cients upon which the index is based have to reect the importance of the
regressors. Equation (3) does not do this but it can be replaced by
yit = Zit + it (4)
where Zit is a vector of normalized (zero mean and unit variance) variables.
Note that the inferences for  are the same as those for  and the statistical
properties of the model have not changed but now the size of the  coe¢ cients,
which are referred to as standardized coe¢ cients in the statistical literature,
reect the importance of the variable3 .
As an index which can be used for comparative purposes we propose (what
is K?)
I() = j0j=
K
[
P
k=1
jkj=K + j0j] (5)
Intergenerational educational mobility is about inheritance mechanisms or
equivalently about how an individuals educational success depends on the char-
acteristics of the household in which he or she resided as a child and an ado-
lescent. I() is a measure of this dependence and it takes the value zero if
the intercept term is equal to zero and only family background variables are
important in determining educational outcomes. When I() = 1 this describes
a society which exhibits perfect mobility. For sociologists interested in mobility,
a perfectly mobile society is one in which the odds associated with categories
i and j in an outcome variable are the same for all social groups which occurs
when family background variables are unimportand or when I() = 1. We will
have more to say on this point in section 7.
This is an improvement on and generalization of an index rst proposed by
McIntosh (2010). It gives equal weighting to all of the regression coe¢ cients
3On this point see Wooldridge (2006: 196).
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once they have been normalized to take account of their importance. Using
the average absolute value of the slope coe¢ cients means that the index is not
a¤ected by the number of regressors. In section 6 the index will be expanded to
take account of random e¤ects in probability models (changes in  over time).
In addition to this mobility index we will also show how the coe¢ cients as-
sociated with a particular family characteristic change relative to the intercept
terms. These will be represented by subindexes which are similar to that de-
scribed in equation (5) and reveal what is happening at a more disaggregated
level.
The data that researchers have to use to get results in the economics and
sociology of education are often not suitable for the application of regression
methods. Educational choices are most often described by qualitative measures.
In a classic paper Robert Mare (1980) laid the foundations for the analysis of
individual progress through the educational system. In Mare type stage models
the outcome variable for individual i is a vector Di = (Di1; Di2::DiSi) which is a
sequence of ones followed by a zero for the last component indicating successful
completion of rst Si   1 stages but a failure to complete stage Si. Success at
stage s is modelled as a random process where success occurs when the latent
variable
Dis = sZis + si + is s = 1; 2:::Si (6)
is non-negative. i is the ability or some other unobservable attribute of indi-
vidual i and is is a random e¤ect whose distribution is usually assumed to be
logistic with variance 2=3. The is are assumed to be independent across indi-
viduals and stages. When i can be observed by the researcher the probability
of being successful at stage s is
PrfDis  0g =
exp(sZis + si)
1 + exp(sZis + si)
s = 1; 2:::Si (7)
These probabilities can be used to construct a likelihood function whose contri-
bution from individual i is
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L(Di) =
Si 1Y
s=1
PrfDis  0gPrfDiSi < 0g (8)
On the other hand when i can not be observed serious estimation problems
arise. When there is no information on i the error term for stage s becomes
si + is. As Lillard and Willis (1994) noted these errors are correlated across
stages because of the common dependence on i and while the probability of
passing or failing the rst is based on a univariate distribution, the probabilities
involving second and third stage outcomes are described by a bivariate distrib-
ution or a trivariate distribution etc. Consequently, the likelihood function in
equation (8) is not the correct one for this model and when the correct model is
used the estimation of the parameters quickly becomes intractable as the num-
ber of stages increases. The correct likelihood function for the three stage model
can be found in Lillard and Willis (1994: 1138).
What actually happens when researchers estimate Mare educational stage
models and ignore the presence of unobservable factors like ability was rst ex-
plored by Mare (1993: 365; see also Mare 2011) himself and later in a classic
paper by Cameron and Heckman (1998). By simulating a simple stage model
with one regressor and the unobservable i and s = 1 for all s Cameron and
Heckman were able to show that the estimates, bs, declined as the stage in-
creased, although the true values of s were all equal to 1. The cause of this is
what they refer to as dynamic selection bias. Even if i is normalized to have a
zero mean and unit variance for the population that starts at the beginning of
the simulation the successive application of the passing criterion to each stage
will select on the more able as the less able fail to succeed to higher stages. After
the rst stage mean ability of those who remain in the system will be greater
than zero and this will increase with each stage. In order to accommodate the
increasingly positive mean of (si + is), bs will have to be smaller than the
true parameter value and it will decline as s increases.
From these simulations Cameron and Heckman concluded that the declining
ascription result that so many sociologist had found was based on a statistical
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aw in the model that was being used. The major claim that many sociologists
have made is that the respondents dependence on family background variables
(particularly, parental levels of education) on academic success diminishes the
further the respondent advances in the schooling system. This may or may not
be correct but when it is shown that this is what will happen when there are
inadequate controls for the e¤ects of unobservable variables the only alternative
is to start afresh and develop statistical procedures which can deal with the
problems that arise with this type of data.
They also claimed that the Mare model stage model was not non-parametrically
identied unless there were some di¤erent variables for each stage. We have
found using simulation methods that this is not the case when there are more
variables than stages4 .
The Danish data that will be used in this paper exhibit some of the complex-
ities mentioned in this section. There are characteristics of Danish adolescents
which are not observable to us. But we want to draw valid inferences about
what matters in the decision making processes of our respondents and whether
this has changed over time. Our statistical model has the same mathematical
structure as the Mare model outlined above so that dealing with unobservables
is a problem for us as well.
3 Data and variables
The data used in this study comes from Statistics Denmark register data on two
cohorts of 23 olds. The two cohorts were born in 1962 and 1982, respectively.
Danish registers are very comprehensive and contain a great deal of information
on every individual5 . Everyone who was aged 23 and was born in Denmark was
included in the sample but parental background variables were collected when
the respondents were aged 16. These registers contain the central population
register numbers for the parents of each individual. Hence, for each cohort it
4Anyone interested in these simulation results can obtain them from the authors upon
request.
5The construction of the dataset was built on ideas from an earlier research project about
Education and Inequality (see Munk 2003b).
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is possible to assemble a data set which contains personal information on the
individual as well as a set of variables relating to his or her family background.
This was done for each cohort. Register data for individuals born prior to 1962
is not as comprehensive and is characterized by large numbers of missing values
for parental information so 1982 is the earliest cohort that could be used6 .
For the dependent variable our choice is the three category variable: com-
pleted level of secondary education at age 23. In Denmark all students are
compelled to complete primary education which is grade nine; but about 60%
go on to grade ten. After grade nine or ten there are two further educational
choices at the upper secondary level in addition not continuing at all. The indi-
vidual can elect to enroll in a vocational programme. Welding, carpentry, hair
dressing, or being an electrician are typical options. Vocational programmes
can take quite a long time to complete and involve apprenticeships. The entire
programme can take up to ve years to complete.
Gymnasiums, the other option for those to continue at the upper secondary
level, o¤er four types of curricula: a general program with various theoretical
programmes in the humanities, natural and social sciences, a technical program,
a business program, and a preparatory programme for university. After grade
nine or ten students can enroll in these programmes which typically last about
three years and provide qualications that are required for entrance to a uni-
versity. Many programmes involving short or intermediate tertiary educational
programmes also require a completed gymnasium certicate for entry. In the
data set here an individual is in the designated category if the individual had
completed the programme associated with it.
The numbers and percentage allocations for each cohort are displayed in
Table 1. There are number of variables for parental characteristics. Parents
education is a six category variable where the rst category is no education past
grade nine or ten. The second category is a vocational qualication, the third is
gymnasium only and the next are three categories of tertiary education which
6 In what follows we refer to a cohort by the year when the respondent was aged 23 and
not the year of birth.
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in Denmark are characterized by their durations: short, medium and long, and
the varying level of academic content in them. Examples for the three types
are police training, primary school teacher training and university, respectively.
The residual category is no education past grade nine or ten. In some of the
analysis of the categories are grouped together when sample sizes are too small.
There are eight parental occupations; the rst three are white collar occupations
starting with high level managerial, low level managerial and ordinary employee.
Occupations four, ve, and six are self-employed and skilled and unskilled blue
collar workers and occupation seven is the missing category. For the rst cohort
there are many parents whose occupations are not known and it does not seem
appropriate to combine them with the unemployed so they are represented a
separate category for all of the cohorts although there is very little missing
parental information for the last cohort. The residual category consists of those
who are unemployed or not in the labour force.
The data set also contains the number of siblings, whether the father was
unemployed, whether the respondents mother was a single mother, and house-
hold income. These were collected at various ages depending on the particular
variable.
Table 4 contains information on education participation rates for the same
two cohorts. Unlike the data in Table 1 these are not completions but simply
enrollments in university education programmes. Parents with missing educa-
tional information were included at the estimation stage but sometimes excluded
in later calculations where their inclusion would have lead to misleading results
had they been used in the construction of Tables 4 to 6.
4 Estimation methods and models
The three choices open to Danish students who have completed lower secondary
education can be achieved by making two decisions. The rst decision is whether
to be involved in any type of upper secondary education at all and the second is,
given the decision to participate in further upper secondary education, whether
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the student will attend a gymnasium or take a more practically oriented voca-
tional type of training. This is, of course, a purely conceptual framework for
analyzing these three decisions but we see this as a realistic characterization of
this decision process and as will be shown later in section 6 this way of modelling
these decisions is statistically superior to other alternatives which could be used
to explain the data.
To go further in the educational system rst requires a desire or some moti-
vation to make the sacrices necessary to turn an educational programme into a
successful educational qualication. Success in this endeavor also requires some
ability. Attitudes, desires and ambitions are in part determined by the envi-
ronment in which the student resided when these decisions are made. So let us
suppose that there is an index which depends on these environmental variables
which represents the intensity of the desire to make a success of oneself. Let
this be
yiI = 0I + ZiII + Ii + iI (9)
where ZiI is a set of normalized family background and other variables which
describe the environment of the respondent and (Ii+iI) is an error term with
two components. i is an individual specic random e¤ect which could represent
the respondents ability or some other unobservable attribute and iI measures
other random e¤ects that are important in the rst decision. The sum of these
two components will be assumed to be normally distributed with a variance 2I .
The value of this latent variable will determine how the respondent makes his
or her rst choice. In keeping with traditions associated with latent variable
models we will assume that the respondent decides to pursue some additional
education past grade nine or ten if yiI  0:
If the respondent decides to continue in the educational system the decision
about which type of upper secondary educational stream to pursue has to be
made. We assume that this decision is also determined by the value of another
latent variable
yiII = 0II + ZiIIII + IIi + iII (10)
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Here yiII represents a number of attributes including preferences for occupations
which depend more on academic and intellectual skills, analytical ability, and
time preferences which can accommodate the longer durations of programmes
of which attending a gymnasium is the rst step. Individual i will take the
gymnasium option if yiII  0 and the choice will be to go the a vocational
school if yiII < 0: Like y

iI , this will depend on the respondents environmental
background and some random e¤ects, but perhaps not in exactly the same way
so that I and II will not be the same.
This two stage representation of the decision process reects some of the re-
alities of the way Danish students actually made their decisions. At the time the
data was generated students who wanted to go on to a gymnasium were evalu-
ated by their lower secondary school teachers who then made a recommendation
to the gymnasium on their suitability for this option. (Stoceke 2007).
These latent variables generate the probabilities of the three decisions. The
probability that respondent i will go no further in the educational system is
PrfyiI  0g = ( ZiII=I) (11)
where () is the cumulative normal distribution function.
The probability the respondent i takes a vocational course after completing
grade 9 or 10 is more complicated because the error terms are not independent.
In keeping with the assumption that both marginal distributions are normal we
also assume that the joint distribution of f(Ii+iI); (IIi+iII)g is bivariate
normal with correlation coe¢ cient  as Lillard and Willis did. Here the reason
for our use of normal (probit) marginal distributions rather than the more usual
logistic (logit) model is because there is no suitable bivariate logistic distribution
that could be used. Additionally, there are no bivariate distributions which are
substantially di¤erent from the bivariate normal distribution and have, as well,
the unrestricted correlation structure that the bivariate normal distribution has.
It is important to note that i has a di¤erent parameter associated with it
in each error term. This is required to allow for the possibility for a negative
value of  which can arise only when the signs of I and II are di¤erent. What
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i actually could represent will depend on the sign of . This issue is discussed
at the beginning of section 7.
The vocational choice occurs when yiI  0 and yiII < 0:This probability is
PrfyiI  0; yiII < 0g =
1Z
 ZiII=I
 ZiIIII=IIZ
 1
(zI ; zII ; I;II ; )dzIdzII (12)
where () is the bivariate normal density function. Likewise, going to a gym-
nasium occurs when yiI  0 and yiII  0; the probability of which is
PrfyiI  0; yiII  0g =
1Z
 ZiII=I
1Z
 ZiIIII=II
(zI ; zII ; I;II ; )dzIdzII (13)
As we have already mentioned, this model has the same formal structure as
the Mare (1980) grade transition model. Although the stages here refer to a
sequence of decisions rather than a sequence of grade transitions through the
educational system the models share the same mathematical structure. The
possibility of allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in these stage models by
including the random e¤ect, i, in each error term was rst proposed by Lillard
and Willis (1994). Consequently our model is analogous to their model but it
is also a correlated version of the Mare model.
It is interesting to note that Lucas et al. (2011) have recently discovered
what Lillard and Willis proposed almost twenty years ago. Their model, like
ours, is the Lillard-Willis model or as we have also described it: the correlated
Mare stagemodel. Like us they also use standardized zero mean unit variance
regressors in their analysis. Since the objective of this research is to compare
the degree of educational mobility for two cohorts born twenty years apart an
aggregate mobility index which measures this is required. The index that we
are going to use is a version of the one proposed in section 2, which for prob-
ability models, become I(=) and its purpose is to measure the importance
of observable family background variables relative to all of the other variables
which could a¤ect respondent academic choices. This index involves all of the
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 parameters as well as the variance of the latent variable. Only parameters
divided by the standard deviation of the error term, t; are identiable in prob-
ability models. In addition, the properties of the index mentioned in section 2
has another feature of the index which makes desirable for our purposes is that
it does not depend on t (since they cancel out) so that comparisons across
cohorts are not going to be contaminated by changes in the variance terms.
This has been a major problem in much of the research on intergenerational
educational mobility (including studies that rely on logistic models) and to our
knowledge this is the rst real solution to this problem.
On the other hand, there is nothing in the index which allows us to say
anything about the relative importance of random e¤ects and how these have
changed over the two cohorts. In addition it is also possible for some of the
omitted variables whose e¤ects are being picked up by the intercept terms to
represent variables associated with the household in which the respondent grew
up. However, they must be the same for all households, hence our emphasis on
the term observable family background variables. As shown in section 7 this
possibility presents no problems for our index.
5 Results
The results for the model outlined in section 5 are shown in Table 2. The rst
and most important point to note is that all four of the mobility indices increase
as the cohorts get younger. It is clear from the rst two rows of this table that
for males, the increases in the two indexes are I(I=I) = 0:092
(0:003) and
I(II=II) = 0:349
(0:131). For females these increases are I(I=I) =
0:123(0:004) and I(II=II) = 0:055
(0:011). For both males and females
observable family background variables have, on average, become less important
relative to the intercept terms in the determination of educational choices for
both of the latent variable indexes. There also have been dramatic increases
in the intercept terms so that models predict signicant increases in the prob-
abilities of the gymnasium choice for all respondents regardless of their socioe-
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conomic background. In particular, the increases in these intercept terms have
lead to larger increases in the conditional probabilities of going to a gymnasium
for respondents coming from disadvantaged households.
It is interesting to note that the responses by the males and females are
di¤erent. For the males it is the preference for type of education that has
exhibited the largest change, whereas, for the females it is the ambition variable.
In Table 7 sub-indexes are displayed for each type of family background
variable. These are the same type of measure that is used in the index except
only the coe¢ cients associated with a particular attribute are used. They pro-
vide additional information about how the relative importance of specic family
background variables have changed over the two time periods. For example, for
males the sub-index for fathers occupation for the second latent variable rises
signicantly from 0.694 (0.117) to 0.898 (0.006). Of course, not all of the
sub-indexes behave in this way. There are no signicant changes in many of
them but for males income has become more important both relatively and
absolutely for both of the latent variables.
All of the variables representing the characteristics of the respondents par-
ents are highly signicant for both cohorts. Household income, the number of
siblings and whether the respondent was brought up by a single mother have
somewhat larger coe¢ cients associated with them than the other regressors. In
Table 2 the e¤ects parent education and occupation are captured by the aver-
ages of the coe¢ cients of the category dummy variables in order to keep the
tables from being too large. For example, for males the estimate for the average
e¤ect of fathers education is 0.049 (0.004)7 .
Changes in the individual parameter estimates across the two cohorts are
not particularly large for some of the regressors but there are some major dif-
ferences across the two cohorts and some of the parameter estimates, like those
7For fathers education in 1985 the 6 I coe¢ cients and their standard errors are 0.050**
(0.006), 0.064** (0.006), 0.034** (0.006), 0.009** (0.004), 0.099** (0.006), and 0.037**(0.004).
The average of these 6 coe¢ cients is 0.049**(0.004) as reported in table 2.
Readers interested in the detailed coe¢ cients associated with the other variables can obtain
them from the authors.
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associated with parent educational attainments or household income, are actu-
ally signicantly larger for the younger cohort. On average the absolute values
of the slope coe¢ cients have increased over the period. However, the reason
why the mobility indices sometimes increase is because the intercept terms are
much larger for the 2005 cohorts. These are displayed in the last two rows
of Table 2. Mobility indexes and averages of absolute coe¢ cient can increase
simultaneously when the increses in the intercept terms are larger than those
associated with the coe¢ cients. There are other consequences of the increases
in the intercept terms and these will be discussed later in this section.
Our approach to mobility is to examine the dependence of educational out-
comes on observable environmental and family background variables. However,
this is not how other researchers look at intergenerational educational mobility
so it is of some interest to contrast what we have found with the results of more
traditional procedures like those used by sociologists interested in mobility.
In Table 3 the conditional probabilities of the three upper secondary educa-
tional outcomes are compared across the three categories of fathers education8 .
Mobility researchers are interested in how these probabilities or ratios of these
probabilities change over time. For both genders the conditional probability of
getting a gymnasium qualication was higher in 2005 than in 1985 for all types
of father. But for all males the conditional probability of getting no upper
secondary education was also higher in 2005.
In the analysis of mobility it is important to distinguish the di¤erence be-
tween absolute and relative changes in mobility; but in our view, both are
important. There is a huge literature which distinguishes between absolute
and relative mobility. See Beller (2009) for a discussion of these two concepts.
Current sociological mobility analysis focuses more on relative changes. Unlike
the absolute measures mentioned above, the odds of graduating from a gymna-
sium as opposed to not participating in upper secondary education is a relative
8Fathers education was chosen because it was slightly more signicant than mothers edu-
cation. However, similar results hold when the education of the respondents mother is used.
Conditional rather than cell probabilities are used since they do not depend on the margins
as represented by the row probabilities.
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measure. These are higher for all educational categories of the father for both
males and females. Furthermore, the odds of getting a gymnasium qualication
as opposed to getting no further education have improved more for respondents
whose father had no education than they did for those respondents whose father
had a gymnasium qualication. Using the data in Tables 3 and 5 it is possible
to see exactly what this means. Note that for 1985 the odds of a male re-
spondent getting a gymnasium qualication as opposed to no further education
given that his father had no education is 0.063/0.182 = 0.346. The same odds
for a male respondent whose father had at least a gymnasium qualication is
0.083/0.022=3.772. Forming the odds ratio 3.772/0.346=10.902 gives a measure
of relative performance which can be compared with other time periods. This
odds ratio falls to 6.564 in 2005 indicating that the relative chances of getting a
gymnasium qualications opposed to no education at all have moved in favour
of respondents whose father had no education. Similar results hold for females.
Sociological mobility theorists measure relative mobility by these odds ratios.
Thus Danish society has not only become more mobile in terms of relative
odds but it is better o¤ since a much larger proportion of individuals is going
further in the educational system than was the case in 1985. That the proportion
males with a gymnasium qualication has increased from 24.0% in 1985 to 40.6%
in 2005, a 69.2% increase, is quite remarkable for the rather short time span
under consideration9 . The only cloud in the Danish educational sky is the
increase in the male conditional probabilities of getting no secondary education
at all.
Our models provide some insight as to why these events have occurred. The
reasons why these probabilities of getting a gymnasium qualication have in-
creased so dramatically over this period is because of the large absolute increases
in the intercept terms, 0I=I and 0II=II . When these increase relative to the
regression coe¢ cients the mobility indices I(I) and I(II) increase indicating
an increase in mobility. But when they increase absolutely, increased mobility
9These results are based on the sample where there is no missing information on fathers
education. They are, however, to results based on the data in Table 1.
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is accompanied by lower drop out (non-participation) probabilities, higher suc-
cess rates at the gymnasium level, or both. Later we will see that our models
help explain why males and females have such di¤erent success rates. It is also
clear that mobility can increase even when the regression coe¢ cients increase
because what is important is their size relative to the intercept terms. Thus our
index can be useful in reconciling these apparently contradictory or paradoxical
results that occur when increases in mobility as measured by increases in odds
and condidtonal probabilities are accompanied by increases in the size of the
regression coe¢ cients.
Turning now to some statistical issues, as we mentioned earlier, our model
is one of several alternatives that could be applied to this data but that it was
preferred to other possible alternatives on statistical grounds. The three educa-
tional categories could be explained by a single index logistic ordered probability
model which is generated by the latent variable crossing two threshold points10 .
The two index multinomial logit model can also be used to explain these choices.
The values of the maximized ln-likelihood function and the (number of parame-
ters) for 2005 males for the ordered logit, multinomial logit, Mare and correlated
Mare model are, respectively, -27074.284 (31), -26469.166 (60), -26437.273 (57)
and -26427.217 (58). The multinomial logit model dominates the ordered logit
model in terms of both AIC and BIC criteria. A Vuong (1989: 320) test in-
dicates that the Mare model has a signicantly higher ln-likelihood function
than the multinomial logit model, and the correlated Mare model is superior to
the Mare model when  is signicantly di¤erent from zero. Similar results hold
for females, hence the correlated Mare or Lillard-Willis model is the vehicle of
choice for the data used in this study. It should also be pointed out that all of
these models are parametrically identied in the sense of Bowden (1973).
10We also tried to estimate latent class (mixture) ordered probability models but serious
convergence di¢ culties were encountered.
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6 Discussion and Conclusions
We have stressed the importance of including a random e¤ect, i; for individual
i in the model; now, given the actual estimates, we can provide some insight as
to what this e¤ect really measures. Usually, in educational attainment models
the unobservable variable, i; is viewed as some measure of ability. This could
be the case here but because, as shown in Table 2, the estimated correlations
between the two error terms are negative, it is likely that there are components
in i that represent other attributes of the respondent which dominate the e¤ects
of unobserved ability on educational choices11 . This variable could include, for
example, individual preferences for doing something practical as opposed to
something esoteric or theoretical or preferences for programmes which take less
time to complete than those that are available with a gymnasium qualication.
If i actually represents preferences for practical or short duration programmes
then individuals with high values of i will want to make something of themselves
and be successful so that I > 0, but they also want fulllment in a practical
sense and do not want to be involved with abstract or theoretical issues which
they would have to deal with if they went to a gymnasium so that II < 0. As
a result they take the vocational option. If this is what i represents then 
will be negative. On the other hand if i just represented unobservable ability
or ambition then then I would be positive. In addition to wanting to get
some some upper secondary education he or she would also be likely to want
to go to a gymnasium so that II would also be positive. But then  would
be positive contradicting the results in Table 2 where the estimated values of
 are negative. This, of course, does not mean that ability is unimportant in
educational decisions; it is just not well represented by i: It is always an open
question as to what unobservables represent. We think the example above is
plausible but there are many other possibilities.
Turning to more general issues, the main result of this research is that mo-
bility has improved because other factors have replaced the more traditional
11Lucas et al (2011) also nd signicant negative correlations in their stage model for some
cohorts.
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variables that represent the characteristics of the households in which the re-
spondents grew up in explaining Danish upper secondary schooling outcomes.
And, as we showed, these new factors that have come to play such an important
role in educational success are captured by the intercept terms in our prob-
ability models. Since these intercept terms, by denition, are picking up the
average e¤ects of the variables that have been omitted from the statistical mod-
els, knowing what they actually represent is crucial in understanding the causes
of mobility change in Denmark.
There are many plausible factors. A short list would probably include the
following items. Recent changes to the gymnasium system like the introduction
of business and technical options have given students more choice. These can
very well have made the gymnasium choice more attractive to members of the
younger cohort. In addition, there has been a change in attitudes or perceptions
about the value of going to a gymnasium in terms of the options it gives to
attendees for acquiring tertiary education as noted by Andersen (2004: 60-61).
The abandonment of tracking in lower secondary education which occurs when
students are allocated to streams based on potential, may also be part of the
reason why the cohorts who went through the school system after 1980 were
able to be more successful12 .
Social programmes including welfare support and unemployment insurance
programmes which had been established prior to the 1990s lead to major reduc-
tions in poverty. These have been nanced by high tax rates which generated
a high level of living standards for the average Dane. After 1993 there were
considerable changes in Danish social policy and there were some new policies
that could have a¤ected educational decisions. Reduced entitlements to welfare
programmes (Rosdahl 2003: 123) and the tying of benets to schooling deci-
sions made the costs of not getting more education much higher (Munk 2001:
94, 2003a). Esping-Andersen (2004: 131) has suggested, somewhat controver-
sially, that the cohorts who were making educational choices in 1990s were
12There is a very large literature on tracking. See Hanushek and Wössman (2006) for the
e¤ects of this for a sample of European countries.
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the rst to fully benet from the expansion of the day-care programmes at the
end of the 1970s and thus were in a better position to participate is secondary
education. Yet another plausible explanation is that children benets from in-
creasingly better educated mothers (Mare and Maralani 2006). Finally, it could
be that non-cognitive or personal traits have become more important Bowles et
al. (2001), Borghans et al. (2008), Diprete and Jennings 2012.
As we noted earlier it is possible that some of these omitted variables are
also family background variables. However, this should not a¤ect how our index
should be interpreted because it is observable variables like parent education,
income, or occupation that are the focus of interest in mobility research. Sup-
pose, for example, in the determination of respondent educational success, what
parents do for their children has become much more important than who the par-
ents are, as represented by their characteristics13 . Any mobility calculation, like
our index or computing odds or odds ratios from mobility tables, which com-
pare parent and respondent educational attainments will show an increase in
mobility because respondent educational outcomes have become less dependent
on parent characteristics. Unfortunately, the reason why mobility has increased
will not be apparent to the researcher if it caused by changes in variables which
are not observable. Nonetheless, the extent to which respondents inherit similar
characteristics to those of their parents is still an issue of great interest to both
the research community and to civil servants and politicians charged with the
responsibility of implementing and evaluating social and educational policies, a
position which has been recently emphasized by Heckman (2008).
While there have been dramatic increases in gymnasium participation should
they encourage us to believe that similar results will eventually be found at
the university level? Looking at Table 4 the percentage of males who had
started a university education programme rises from 8.6% in 1985 to 17.1% in
13Continuing with this example, Danish parents on average appear to be doing more for
their children now than was the case twenty years ago so this variable can also be seen as part
of an accepted social norm rather than being a variable that is exclusively associated with the
family. This point is also addressed by Breen and Jonsson (2007) underlining a universalistic
norm. See also Mare and Maralani (2006) and their work.
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2005. This is truly a remarkable change and an even larger change holds for
females. As Table 4 shows these gains have been generated by the participation
of respondents regardless of their fathers educational attainment. Conditional
probabilities are higher in 2005 for both genders for all types of father than
they were in 1985 as are the odds. Odds ratios have also moved in favour of
respondents whose fathers had no education for both genders. Thus the results
that were found for upper secondary school are repeated at the university level
for the sample of respondents who obtained a gymnasium qualication.
Of course, this result should be interpreted with some caution since some
of the attendees will drop out and there will be entrants at ages above 23 who
will eventually enroll in university educational programmes. However, these
changes in attendance behaviour patterns appear to be of fairly recent origin so
a comprehensive analysis of university completion rates will have to be deferred
until these cohorts have had the opportunity to complete the programmes they
have started.
One of the more important variables which matters in educational choices
is household income. Like Blanden and Gregg (2004) and Blanden, Gregg and
MacMillan (2011) we also nd highly signicant parameter estimates associated
with this variable. This is consistent with our results using sample survey data
in McIntosh and Munk (2007). In Denmark, like Britain, the e¤ect of house-
hold income on choices is very important and has actually increased over the pe-
riod. We interpreted high household incomes as proxies for parental competence
rather than something which eases credit constraints since secondary education
is free in Denmark. However, it is possible that higher income households are
able to provide more of the things for their children that matter in the human
capital accumulation process like access to personal computers, reading materi-
als in the home, choice of high quality day-care, living in a good neighbourhood
etc. But, whatever the causal mechanism happens to be household income has
a dramatically increased impact on upper secondary school outcomes.
However, it should not be forgotten that in spite of this increase in the im-
portance of household income; when all factors are considered the dependence
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of secondary educational choices on observable family background variables has
actually declined relative to other factors over the period. It would be interest-
ing to see whether this is what has happened in Britain, and other countries
where household income is important, when a full selection of family background
variables is used in addition to household income.
Finally, there are some major results concerning gender. First, females ap-
pear to have experienced the biggest change in the rates of completing gym-
nasium. Our models provide some insight here. The rst latent variable is an
indicator of overall enthusiasm, ambition, or a desire for self-betterment; the
second indicates preferences for the gymnasium option. There was a signicant
increase in one of the indexes for both genders: gymnasium preference for males
and enthusiasm or ambition for females. The increases in the intercept terms
were also much larger for females than for males which explains why female
respondents from educationally disadvantaged households were more successful
than males with similar backgrounds.
Secondly, the trends in dropping out of the school system are di¤erent for
the two genders. As can be seen from the row and column sums in Table 3,
fathers with no education declined from 46.7% in 1985 to 26.7% in 2005 but
this process has come to a halt for the next generation since the dropout rate
for sons is 29.5% in 1985 and only slightly lower in 2005 at 28.5%. For females
there is a similar large decline in the drop out rate for the fathers of daughters
in 1985. But this decline is still continuing for females since the dropout rate
for females declines from 34.4% in 1985 to 23.1% in 2005.
One of the more interesting features of Table 3 is the simultaneous increase
in the conditional probabilities of both getting no upper secondary education
as well as getting a gymnasium qualication for males. This suggest to us that
there are conicting inuences which determine how sixteen year old boys make
this important decision. Since this phenomenon involves all boys regardless of
their fathers education it is probably more related to broader issues than those
associated with disadvantage. Unfortunately, the data in our sample provides
no information on this topic. However, it is important and deserves further
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examination.
At the university level females continue to outperform males but the per-
formance gap is much less than it was at the upper secondary school level.
Gymnasium is an entry requirement for most university education programmes.
There is a much higher proportion of females with a gymnasium qualication,
57.6% as opposed to 40.6% for males. But 42.1% of males with a gymnasium
qualication start university whereas only 33.7% percent of women with a gym-
nasium qualication start university. Thus, female educational advantage is still
present but decreases as respondents advance through the educational system.
As is the case in many countries14 , the gender revolution continues.
7 Acknowledgment
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 22nd Congress of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, Budapest, Hungary, in August 2007, at the IARIW
conference, St. Gallen, Switzerland in August 2010, and at the RC28 conference
at Essex University, England, in April 2011. We thank the participants for their
comments on our paper as well as Fredrik Gerstoft for research assistance. We
also thank Robert Mare for his comments on an earlier version of the paper.
14Denmark is not the only country to experience this. In the United States, Buchmann,
DiPrete and McDaniel (2008: 326) report women earn more university degrees than men.
Women also earn their degrees more quickly, and they reported that 66% of women who
enrolled in college in 19951996 had completed a bachelors degree by 2001, compared with
only 59% of men. The Danish experience, in spite of the di¤erences in social structurean
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TABLES
Table 1
The Distribution of Completed Upper Secondary
Educational Attainments (Proportions) by Cohort.
Males Females
Type of Education 1985 2005 1985 2005
Gymnasium 8914 (0.233) 10792 (0.388) 12587 (0.341) 14685 (0.549)
Vocational 16959 (0.442) 8144 (0.292) 10681 (0.289) 5012 (0.187)
None 12257 (0.320) 8793 (0.316) 13481 (0.365) 6956 (0.260)
Total 38130 (1.000) 27737 (1.000) 36749 (1.000) 26653 (1.000)
TABLE 2
Parameter Estimates
Males Males Females Females
1985 2005 1985 2005
Parameter (se)
I(I) 0.894**(0.003) 0.986**(0.001) 0.861**(0.004) 0.984**(0.001)
I(II) 0.636**(0.129) 0.985**(0.001) 0.926**(0.010) 0.981**(0.001)
I 0.060**(0.001) 0.064**(0.002) 0.061**(0.002) 0.066**(0.002)
II 0.045**(0.003) 0.062**(0.003) 0.038**(0.003) 0.074*(0.006)
 -0.738**(0.001) -0.707**(0.062) -0.785**(0.057) -0.306y (0.187)
Fathers Education
I(FE) 0.049**(0.004) 0.057**(0.003) 0.035**(0.004) 0.065**(0.007)
II(FE) 0.124**(0.009) 0.149**(0.011) 0.078**(0.008) 0.147**(0.013)
Fathers Occupation
I(FO) 0.084**(0.005) 0.062**(0.003) 0.010**(0.005) 0.063**(0.007)
II(FO) 0.064**(0.007) 0.079**(0.006) 0.032**(0.007) 0.059**(0.010)
Mothers Education
I(ME) 0.038**(0.002) 0.044**(0.003) 0.048**(0.004) 0.038**(0.006)
II(ME) 0.091**(0.004) 0.117**(0.006) 0.083**(0.005) 0.109**(0.008)
Mothers Occupation
I(MO) 0.038**(0.002) 0.045**(0.003) 0.033**(0.004) 0.063**(0.007)
II(MO) 0.091**(0.004) 0.054**(0.006) 0.010*(0.004) 0.059**(0.006)
Number of Siblings
I(NS) -0.148**(0.006) -0.086**(0.009) -0.129**(0.006) -0.093**(0.010)
II(NS) -0.018 (0.011) 0.006 0.010) -0.040**(0.008) -0.024
* (0.012)
Household Income
I(HI) 0.126**(0.007) 0.218**(0.014) 0.112**(0.009) 0.193**(0.016)
II(HI) 0.058**( 0.007) 0.027**(0.011) 0.052**(0.009) 0.122**(0.022)
Father Unemployed
I(FU) -0.041**( 0.006) -0.045**(0.008) -0.037**(0.006) -0.035**(0.009)
II(FU) 0.019*(0.008) 0.049** (0.011) 0.013
y (0.011) 0.002 (0.002)
Single Mother
I(SM) -0.116**(0.006) -0.117**(0.008) -0.087**(0.006) -0.137**(0.009)
II(SM) 0.031**(0.009) 0.045**(0.010) -0.047**(0.008) 0.035**(0.014)
Intercept terms
0I 0.507**(0.007) 0.534**(0.008) 0.379**(0.007) 0.721**(0.009)
0II -0.079**(0.034) 0.475**(0.040) 0.473**(0.020) 0.809**(0.067)
; and  indicate signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE 3
Cell Probabilities and Conditional Cell Probabilities For Respondent´´s
Upper Secondary Education by Father´´s Educational Attainment, 1985 and 2005.
Males
1985 2005
Fathers None Voc. Gym. Row None Voc. Gym. Row
Education Sum Sum
None 0.182 0.222 0.063 0.467 0.110 0.093 0.064 0.267
0.389 0.475 0.135 0.412 0.348 0.240
Vocational 0.091 0.200 0.094 0.385 0.126 0.175 0.155 0.456
0.236 0.519 0.244 0.276 0.384 0.332
Gymnasium+ 0.022 0.042 0.083 0.147 0.049 0.039 0.187 0.275
0.150 0.286 0.565 0.178 0.142 0.680
Column Sum 0.295 0.464 0.240 1.0 0.285 0.307 0.406 1.0
Females
1985 2005
Fathers None Voc. Gym. Row None Voc. Gym. Row
Education Sum Sum
None 0.201 0.151 0.120 0.472 0.095 0.065 0.109 0.269
0.426 0.320 0.254 0.353 0.242 0.405
Vocational 0.119 0.126 0.139 0.384 0.101 0.108 0.252 0.461
0.310 0.328 0.362 0.219 0.234 0.547
Gymnasium+ 0.024 0.025 0.095 0.144 0.035 0.019 0.215 0.269
0.167 0.174 0.660 0.130 0.071 0.799
Column Sum 0.344 0.302 0.354 1.0 0.231 0.192 0.576 1.0
Notes for Tables 3 and 4;: The entry at the top of the cell
is the cell probability and the lower entry is the conditional
probability which is the cell probability divided by the row
sum. Fathers whose educational qualication are missing are excluded.
Gymnasium+ means a gymnasium qualication or some tertiary qualication.
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TABLE 4
Cell Probabilities and Conditional Cell Probabilities For Respondent´s
University Participation by Father´s Educational Attainment, 1985 and 2005.
Males.
Fathers Education 1985 2005
Not in In Row Sum Not in In Row Sum
University University University University
None 0.451 0.020 0.471 0.253 0.021 0.274
0.958 0.042 0.923 0.077
Vocational 0.353 0.028 0.381 0.401 0.052 0.452
0.927 0.073 0.885 0.115
Gymnasium+ 0.109 0.038 0.147 0.176 0.098 0.274
0.741 0.256 0.059 0.359
Column Sum 0.913 0.086 1.0 0.829 0.171 1.0
Females
Fathers Education 1985 2005
Not in In Row Sum Not in In Row Sum
University University University University
None 0.461 0.014 0.475 0.250 0.025 0.275
0.970 0.029 0.909 0.091
Vocational 0.362 0.020 0.382 0.392 0.064 0.456
0.948 0.052 0.860 0.140
Gymnasium+ 0.115 0.028 0.144 0.164 0.105 0.269
0.799 0.194 0.610 0.390
Column Sum 0.938 0.062 1.0 0.806 0.194 1.0
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Table 5
Selected Odds and Odds Ratios for Males and Females 1985 2005
Upper Secondary Education.
Males
1985 2005
Odds Odds Ratio Odds Odds Ratio
I Gym vs. NonejNone 0.346 0.582
II Gym vs. NonejVoc 1.032 1.230
III Gym vs. NonejGym 3.772 III/I III/I
10.902 3.820 6.564
Females
1985 2005
Odds Odds Ratio Odds Odds Ratio
I Gym vs. NonejNone 0.597 1.147
II Gym vs. NonejVoc 1.168 2.495
III Gym vs. NonejGym 3.952 III/I 6.143 III/I
6.620 6.142 2.175
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Table 6
Selected Odds and Odds Ratios for Males and Females 1985 2005
University Participation.
Males
1985 2005
Odds Odds Ratio Odds Odds Ratio
I In vs. Not InjNone 0.044 0.083
II In vs. Not InjVoc 0.111 0.130
III In vs. Not InjGym+ 0.349 III/I 0.560 III/I
7.932 6.746
Females
1985 2005
Odds Odds Ratio Odds Odds Ratio
I In vs. Not InjNone 0.030 0.100
II In vs. Not InjVoc 0.055 0.163
III In vs. Not InjGym+ 0.243 III/I III/I
8.100 6.400
TABLE 7
Sub-Index estimates
Males Males Females Females
1985 2005 1985 2005
Fathers Education
jI0j=I(FE) 0.912**(0.008) 0.905**(0.009) 0.915**(0.011) * 0.917**(0.006)
jII0j=II(FE) 0.497**(0.141) * 0.810**(0.015) 0.883**(0.019) 0.865**(0.017)
Fathers Occupation
jI0j=I(FO) 0.858**(0.008) * 0.897**(0.008) 0.792**(0.010) * 0.919**(0.006)
jII0j=II(FO) 0.695**(0.117) * 0.898**(0.006) 0.974**(0.012) 0.948**(0.012)
Mothers Education
jI0j=I(ME) 0.924**(0.007) 0.907**(0.007) 0.887**(0.010) * 0.935**(0.004)
jII0j=II(ME) 0.550**(0.140) * 0.845**(0.008) 0.875**(0.016) 0.892**(0.011)
Mothers Occupation
jI0j=I(MO) 0.938**(0.007) + 0.909**(0.005) 0.896**(0.009) * 0.921**(0.004)
jII0j=II(MO) 0.809**(0.095) 0.952**(0.009) 0.938**(0.022) 0.942**(0.008)
Number of Siblings
jI0j=I(NS) 0.813**(0.012) * 0.866**(0.012) 0.760**(0.013) * 0.883**(0.010)
jII0j=II(NS) 0.817**(0.085) 0.988**(0.018) 0.923**(0.018) * 0.971**(0.010)
Household Income
jI0j=I(HI) 0.801**(0.012) + 0.712**(0.008) 0.775**(0.014) 0.788**(0.007)
jII0j=II(HI) 0.588**(0.132) * 0.957**(0.015) 0.938**(0.022) + 0.894**(0.017)
Father Unemployed
jI0j=I(FU) 0.925**(0. 012) 0.923**(0.011) 0.912**(0.016) * 0.955**(0.009)
jII0j=II(FU) 0.807** (0.134) * 0.905**(0.014) 0.958**(0.017) 0.987**(0.011)
Single Mother
jI0j=I(SM) 0.803**(0.010) 0.813**(0.009) 0.807**(0.013) * 0.842**(0.007)
jII0j=II(SM) 0.718**(0.170) * 0.913**(0.015) 0.910**(0.017) * 0.957**(0.010)
Intercept terms
0I 0.507**(0.007) * 0.534**(0.008) 0.379**(0.007) * 0.721**(0.009)
0II -0.079**(0.034) * 0.475**(0.040) 0.473**(0.020) * 0.809**(0.067)
Sub-indexes are of the form jk0j=[
P jkj j=Kj + jk0j] where k = I; II and
j = FE; FO; etc: * and + indicate signicant increase or decrease in the
index at the 5 percent level.
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